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The FOMC in 1992: A Monetary
WEAK, HESITANT AND protracted recov-
ery was under way during 1992. Heal gross
domestic product (GDP) did not regain its
prerecession level until third quarter 1992, a
year and a half after the recession’s trough. On
the whole, however, incoming data were less
negative during 1992 than in 1991 and the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) generally
displayed more confidence that the economy
was growing in 1992.’ As concern about a fur-
ther economic downturn receded, troubling
aspects of the monetary aggregates’ behavior
became more prominent in FOMC deliberations.
Since mid-1991, an unusual combination of
very slow M2 growth and rapid growth of
reserves and Ml has drawn considerable atten-
tion.’ The juxtaposition of fast Ml and reserve
growth and slow M2 growth was an important
conundrum for policymakers in 1992: Was slow
M2 growth constricting economic recovery
(though slowing inflation at the same time), or
was rapid Ml growth a signal of future infla-
tionary pressure (though perhaps supporting
rapid recovery)? These worst-case interpreta-
tions highlight the range of uncertainty raised
by anomalous behavior of an important set of
indicators.
The article begins with an outline of major
economic developments in 1992 followed by an
examination of the aforementioned monetary
conundrum. These first two sections provide a
backdrop for more detailed discussion in the
third section of the eight FOMC meetings and
policy actions taken between meetings. Because
discussion of monetary policy often uses poten-
tially ambiguous terms such as easing, I have in-
cluded a shaded insert, “Translating the FOMC
Policy Directives,” which explains how some of
these terms are used in FOMC directives and in
discussions of monetary policy.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN
1992
A month-by-month account of economic de-
velopments makes it is easy to lose sight of
broader patterns. Figure 1 illustrates some of
these patterns. A wide-angle view reveals that
‘The FOMC comprises the seven governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, and, on a rotating basis, the presidents
of four of the other 11 regional Federal Reserve Banks.
The seven remaining presidents attend the meetings and
present their views but do not vote.
‘Ml comprises currency, traveler’s checks and checkable
deposits. M2 combines Ml with savings deposits, money
market mutual funds, small time deposits, and some
smaller items.
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the 1991-92 recovery was the slowest since
World War 11, with gr-owth below the long-run
average for’ several quarters and little employ-
ment growth. A narrower focus highlights the
fact that the economy was substantially stronger
in 1992 than in 1991 and that the second half
of 1992 was substantially stronger than the first
half, despite pessimistic expectations from
midyear onward. An important featur’e of 1991
and 1992 was the dramatic fall of interest rates
(see figure 2). A notable aspect of this decline
was the sharp steepening of the yield curve;
short-term interest rates fell much mon-c than
long-term r’ates. The increase in the rate spread
between 10-year and three-month Treasury
rates following the business cycle trough in
March 1991, for’ example, is larger than that in
any postwar recovery period.
The U.S. economy ended 1991 with a whim-
per: GDP grew at an annual rate of less than
0.6 percent in the fourth quarter. The FOMC
ended the year with a significant easing that
coincided with aIpercentage point cut in the
discount rate.’ The federal funds rate then
hovered around 4 percent until April (see figure
2). During the fit-st months of 1992 new eco-
nomic data suggested that the risk of sliding
back into recession had n’eceded; indeed it
turned out that the economy grew at a 3 per-
cent rate in the first quarter.
M2 started the year with a month of strong
‘Throughout this article the terms ease and easing used in
connection with specific policy actions have a narrow
meaning that is spelled out in the shaded insert “Translat-
ing the FOMC Policy Directives.” In other instances, easy
and tight are used in a more general way to refer to the
overall stance of monetary policy, a much less well-defined
concept.33
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growth but then began to decline. In April, fall-
ing M2, together with “indications that the eco-
nomic expansion was not as strong as its pace
early in the year,” prompted an easing action.~
Immediately following this action, the federal
funds rate fell substantially but then stabilized
around 3.75 percent until the end of June.
Data for’ April and May were more positive,
but many indicators for June (released around
the beginning of July) led to a swing toward
pessimism. Industrial production, employment,
retail sales, MI and M2 all tilted down. The
growth of real GDP had fallen to only 1.5 per-
cent in the second quarter’. Both the Board staff
and private forecasters became more pessimistic
about growth prospects for the second half of
the year. The private sector Blue Chip consen-
sus forecasts for GDP growth in the second half
of the year made in June, July and August
were 3.2 percent, 3.0 percent and 2.8 percent,
respectively.’
At the beginning of July the Board of Gover-
nors cut the discount rate from 3.5 percent to
3.0 percent. This was accompanied by open
4See Federal Reserve press release July 2, 1992, p. 4. The
press releases referred to in the remainder of this article
are dated March 29, 1991; April 3, 1992; May 22, 1992; July
2, 1992; August 21, 1992; October 9, 1992; November 20,
1992; December 24, 1992; and February 5, 1993. All press
releases will be referred to by date. Reserve requirements
on transactions deposits were reduced from 12 percent to
10 percent on April 2. The reduction was intended to
“strengthen the financial condition of banks and thereby
improve their access to capital markets, thus putting them
in a better position to extend credit” (Federal Reserve
Bulletin, April 1992, p. 272). The change apparently had no
significant effect on monetary aggregates and no bearing
on the decision to ease later in the month.
‘See Eggert (1992).34
Figure 1
Growth of Real GDP During Recoveries
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Note:Vertical lines mark FOMC meeting dates.
market operations “directed at allowing the full
amount of the reduction to be reflected in money
market rates.” The federal funds rate then fell
about a 0.5 percentage point. The federal funds
rate subsequently averaged about 3.25 percent
until September. These two actions constituted
the most significant policy move of the year.
Though many indicators turned up in July
(and clown again in Augu.st), M2 continued to
fall despite the actions taken at the beginning of
.luly. In response to the flagging M2 growth and
to continuing signs of sluggish economic growth,
another easing action was implemented in early
September? ‘i’he federal funds rate remained
higher than expected following this action hut
settled down to around 3.0 percent by the end
of October and remained there for the re-
mainder of the year.’ Positive M2 growth re-
sumed during the second half of the year,
supported by rapid growth of reserves, but
‘October 9, 1992 press release, p. 4.
7November 20, 1992 press release, p. 4.
‘November 20, 1992 press release, p. 4.
‘This issue is treated extensively in Bullard (1992).
turned negative again in December and into 1993.
The second half of 1992 is a case study in the
difficulty of making policy on the basis of fore-
casts and month-by-month changes in economic
data.~‘I’he downturn that threatened at midyear
never- materialized; the economy grew at a 3.4
percent rate in the third quarter- and 4.7 percent
in the fourth. ‘t’his was not apparent during the
third quarter, however, and in fact private fore-
casters remained pessimistic until late in the
year. The July and September easing actions
were taken partly on •the premise •that the econ-
omy was weakening (and partly in response •to
flagging M2 growth), yet economic growth in
the second half of the year ended up much
stronger than during the first half of the year.1°
THE MONETARY CONUNDRUM
During the p-ast two years, M2 has grown
slowly by past standards and has frequently
“Most estimates indicate that it takes at least six months for
any effects of monetary policy actions to be apparent in the
level of real output, so it is unlikely that strong growth in




J F M A M J J A SO NDJ F MA M JJ AS ON D
199236
Figure 3
M2 and M2 Growth Ranges











Note: Vertical lines mark FOMC meeting dates. Pre-benchmark data.
been near or below the growth ranges set by
the FOMC (see figure 3).” The slow overall
growth of M2 has been accompanied by rapid
growth of Ml and reserves (see figure 4).
Reserve growth follows a pattern similar to Ml,
though at higher levels. From December 1991 to
December 1992 M2 grew by 1.8 percent1 MI
grew by 14.1 percent, and total reserves grew
by 19.6 percent. Much of the difference be-
tween Ml and M2 growth rates can be traced
to money market mutual funds and small time
deposits (components of M2 but not of Ml),
which fell substantially during this period.
The FOMC’s stated policy objectives are to
“foster price stability and promote sustainable
growth in output.” Monetary aggregates, partic-
ularly M2, are closely monitored by the FOMC
partly because of their historically close rela-
tionship (by macroeconomic standards) with
nominal GDP. The growth rate of nominal GDP
is approximately equal to the growth of real
GDP plus the inflation rate. Nearly all macro-
economists agree that money’s long-run effect
almost entirely on the price level; that is, the
only thing a central bank can do for the econo-
my in the long run is to keep the inflation rate
low. Though many macroeconomists argue that
short-run economic growth can be bought at
the expense of future inflation, almost all agree
that higher growth induced in this way cannot
be sustained in the long run.” ‘the records of
FOMC meetings indicate that Committee discus-
sions take for granted that monetary policy has
an effect on real economic activity in the short
run.”
is
“Data on the monetary aggregates were benchmarked at
the end of 1992. All monetary data in both text and charts
of this article are pre-benchmark data.
“Economists who agree with this statement as a theoretical
proposition can be subdivided into those who think that
monetary policy can help stabilize real GDP and those who
think that the attempt is likely to be counterproductive in
practice, even if it is possible in principle.
“The April 3 press release, for example, states, ‘The mem-
bers generally agreed that enough monetary stimulus prob-
ably had been implemented to foster the desired upturn in
economic activity ... “ (p. 16).
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Figure 4
Growth of Ml and M2
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates
Note: Horizontal bars indicate FOMC meetings (right end) and last available data
(leftend). Pre-benchmark data.
In recent years many economists and policy-
makers have agreed that it is desirable to use a
monetary aggregate as an intermediate indicator
of the thrust of monetary policy. Unfortunately,
the economic theory underlying these conclu-
sions is not specific enough to recommend the
use of any particular monetary aggregate. An
ideal monetary aggregate has a strong connec-
tion with policvmakers’ goals but is also closely
related to their actions, primarily open market
operations. No single aggregate has met both
criteria consistently over time. For several years
the FOMC has paid closer attention to M2 be-
cause it has been a somewhat better indicator
of the long-run growth of nominal income. 14
The Federal Reserve has more direct influence
over Ml, however, because its checkable
deposit component is closely tied to the level of
reserves.” That there is a tighter link between
Federal Reserve actions and narrower aggregates
such as Ml has persuaded some economists arid
policyrnakers to give relatively more weight to
narrower aggregates in evaluating the stance of
monetary policy.’’
“During the early 1980s the FOMC paid close attention to
Ml. In 1982, they began to place more emphasis on M2
but still set Ml growth ranges. In 19B7 they decided to quit
setting Ml targets, citing “uncertainties about its underly-
ing relationship to the behavior of the economy and its
sensitivity to a variety of economic and financial circum-
stances.” See Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1967).
“It should be noted, however, that one of the factors that
led the FOMC to begin to de-emphasize Ml in the early
19805 was the difficulty in controlling the aggregate during
a period of rapid deregulation and financial innovation.
“Members of the Shadow Open Market Committee (a group
of academic and business economists not affiliated with
the Federal Reserve System) have often expressed these




The juxtaposition of rapid growth of Ml and
reserves with the slow growth of Ma was the
monetary conundrum policymakers faced in
1992. Though the Committee no longer sets a
target range for Ml, this is more than an arcane
technical issue: If the relationship between Ma
and nominal GDP had broken down, the slow
growth of Ma might be misleading, and the
rapid growth of reserves and Ml might signal
increasing future inflation. If not, the slowdown
of M2 might reliably signal slow growth of
nominal income that could endanger the eco-
nomic recovery in the short run and cause
deflation in the long run.
An observer who was convinced that the rela-
tionship between M2 and nominal GDP had not
broken down, even temporarily, might argue
that, though the growth of Ml and reserves was
high by historical standards, it was inadequate
and that monetary policy was not sufficiently
expansionary. Another observer, convinced that
there had been a breakdown of the link between
M2 and nominal GDP, might argue that slow M2
growth was not a cause for concern, but that
rapid Ml growth signaled future inflation. Most
observers saw more uncertainty and found their
own views somewhere between these extremes.
Why Did M2 Slow Dramatically?
Most hypotheses about the proximate causes
of the slowdown in M2 growth point to changes
in relative returns on Ma assets. Interest rates
on assets included in the M2 aggregate but not
in Ml fell relative to interest rates on other as-
sets, and the public therefore preferred to hold
these other assets. Portfolios were adjusted in
two directions. Because the opportunity cost of
holding transactions balances (mostly MI assets)
relative to other Ma assets had declined, the
public could afford the convenience of larger
transactions balances, thus increasing MI while
the non-Ml components of Ma declined. Perhaps
most important was the movement in the other
direction, from M2 assets, such as small time
deposits, to higher-yielding alternatives not in-
cluded in the Ma aggregate.”
The movement of interest rates on non-Mi
components of Ma relative to other assets was
caused partly by the sharp widening of the
spread between short- and long-term interest
rates (M2 assets tend to have relatively short
maturities) and partly by various factors that
depressed Ma interest rates relative to those on
other assets of comparable maturities. One of
these factors may have been slack demand for
bank loans. Firms and consumers faced with
uncertain demand and income appeared reluc-
tant to borrow at current interest rates. Banks,
seeing the return on new loans little above
Treasury yields, were unwilling to bid up
deposit rates. The slack demand for bank loans
may also reflect a long-run decline in depository
institutions’ share of total intermediation.
It has also been argued that various regulato-
ry changes, including higher capital require-
ments, higher deposit insurance premiums and
closer regulatory scrutiny of portfolios, have in-
creased the cost of bank intermediation, driving
a larger wedge between the rates charged and
the rates paid by depository institutions.
Though the relevance of many of these factors
has been apparent for several years, the lack of
historical precedent has made it extremely
difficult to predict the magnitude and duration
of their influence on Ma.
Did the Relationship between M2
and Nominal GDP Change?
The relationship between M2 and nominal
GDP is summarized by M2 velocity, the ratio of
nominal GDP to Ma. If nominal GDP grows at
the same rate as Ma, velocity is constant. When
nominal GDP grows more quickly (slowly) than
Ma, velocity increases (decreases). Historically
Ma and nominal GDP have grown at approxi-
mately the same rate when averaged over long
intervals. In the short run, when nominal GDP
and Ma growth rates often differ, M2 velocity
has usually moved in the same direction as the
opportunity cost of holding Ma assets, as shown
in figure 5. The opportunity cost measure shown
is the difference between the three-month
Treasury bill rate (representing assets not in-
cluded in Ma) and a weighted average of the in-
terest rates paid on M2 assets. Simple economic
reasoning suggests that, all else equal, as the
true opportunity cost rises, consumers and busi-
nesses should decrease the quantity of Ma assets
they hold. They may, for example, substitute
Treasury bills, which are not in Ma, for small
time deposits, which are in Ma. This substitution
causes M2 to fall and M2 velocity to rise.
“One such high-yield alternative for many firms and con-
sumers was to pay off or avoid debt.Figure 5











Figure 5 shows a substantial rise in M2 veloci-
ty during 1991 and 1992. This would not be
particularly remarkable (several similar episodes
are shown) except that the opportunity cost
measure moved in the opposite direction. The
unprecedented size and duration of the diver-
gence of these vat’iables have been interpreted
as evidence that the relationship between Ma
and nominal GDP may have changed. If this
were true, it would then be difficult to discet-n
the implications of the slow growth of Ma. This
uncertainty about the link between Ma and
nominal GDP led some ohservets and policy-
makers to give added weight to other variables
in assessing the stance of monetary policy. Con-
cerns about rapid Ml and reserve growth were
reinforced by the general steepening of the
yield curve during the year, which appeared to
indicate market expectations of rising short-term
interest rates. The expected incteases could
mean that the investors required a premium to
compensate for rising expected inflation or that
economic recovery was expected to drive real
interest rates higher. Either interpretation would
itnply that monetat-y policy had been sufficiently
expansionary despite the evidence of slow Ma
growth.
A different interpretation of the divergence
between Ma velocity and opportunity cost is
that the relationship has always been more
complicated than figure 5 implies, but only re-
cently has this become important.” The break-
down in the relationship might be only an
artifact of mismeasurement of the opportunity
cost variable and does not necessarily imply a
break between Ma and nominal GDP.
The argument starts by observing that in
pt-inciple the entire spectrum of intet-est rates is
germane to an individual’s decision to hold a
particular Ma asset. In the opportunity cost










“Feinman and Porter (1992) develop this argument in
depth.40
Treasury bill rate represents yields on all non-
Ma assets. For the three-month rate to capture
all of the relevant movements in these yields, in-
terest rates on all non-Ma assets must move in
parallel with it. Figure 5 shows that this ap-
proach has worked well historically, but changes
in returns on non-Ma assets in recent years
may no longer be summarized by movements in
the Treasury bill rate. On this view the diver-
gence between Ma velocity and the measure of
opportunity cost shown in figure 5 does not in-
dicate a breakdown in the long-run relationship
between Ma and nominal GDP. Rather this im-
plies that the recent rise in velocity—like previ-
ous episodes—is temporary, induced largely by
the widening of the difference in yields on
short- and long-term assets and the consequent
failure of this measure to capture the true op~
portunity cost of Ma. If so, M2 velocity may fall
and Ma growth may accelerate when the differ-
ence narrows. However, wariness about short-
run growth of Ma as an indicator of nominal
GOP growth is still warranted.
One effort to implement this line of reasoning
empirically by estimating an opportunity cost
using a broader set of non-Ma yields concludes
that “seen against the background of a more
complete accounting of relevant interest rate
margins, the recent behavior of Ma is not near-
ly as anomalous as suggested by the standard
model.”” The authors note, however, that their
study does not entirely resolve the puzzle.
i’he FOMC did not take a radical position on
the question of whether Ma was growing too
slowly. Though the record of every 199a meet-
ing indicates substantial concern over this issue,
every 1992 policy directive called for maintain-
ing the “existing degree of pressure on reserve
positions” (see table 1). On the other hand, the
largest move toward ease occurred in early July
after Ma fell below the lower bound of its
growth range. Moreover, every easing action
followed a period in which M2 declined or its
growth fell significantly below expected levels.
Members of the FOMC expressed a range of
views about whether the Fed should ease enough
to ensure that Ma growth rebounded to the bot-
tom of its growth range. Jerry Jordan, president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, main-
tained that it is particularly important to
“Feinman and Porter (1992), p. 21.
2cwhen such consultations take place, they are noted in the
record of the next meeting. Less formal consultations may
take place, but not be noted in the record.
achieve Ma growth in the target range and voted
against the proposed directive at two meetings
for this reason. Governor Lawrence Lindsey
joined him once in his dissent.
At the other end of the spectrum Governor
John LaWare and the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Thomas Meizer, vot-
ed against policy directives on four occasions
because they felt that a bias toward ease was
inappropriate during the second half of the
year. They believed that slow Ma growth was
sending a misleading signal and that earlier eas-
ing actions by the FOMC would be sufficient to




The FOMC meets eight times each year. At
the end of each meeting the Committee issues a
directive to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to guide open market operations until the
next meeting. The Committee typically gives the
Chairman some flexibility to initiate policy ac-
tions between meetings (during 1992 all actions
were taken between meetings). These actions
are sometimes agreed on during a conference
call among the members, but this was not done
during 199a.’°
A summary of each meeting, the record of
policy actions, is released to the public shortly
after the next meeting. The record is also pub-
lished in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The shad-
ed insert explains some of the language used in
the monetary policy directives and discussions
of monetary policy.
The following summaries of FOMC meetings
and policy actions between the meetings are in-
tended to give a sense of the main concerns of
the Comnuttee and the information available at
the time. In general the most recent economic
information available to the FOMC is for a peri-
od that ended at least one month before the
meeting. The main exceptions to this are in-
terest rates, which can be observed daily, and
some data that are collected and assembled by
the Federal Reserve System—for example, com-
ponents of the industrial production index and
the monetary aggregates. Figure 8 shows some41
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of the monthly economic data regularly consi-
dered by the Committee. Short horizontal lines
in each chart illustrate the data lags faced by
the Committee. (This device is used in figure 4
as well.) ‘the right end indicates the meeting
date and the left end shows last data available
to the Committee at the time of the meeting. In
addition to this delay, most data series are sub-
ject to revision after their initial release. Figure
6 plots the current revisions of the data, but
significant inconsistencies between the original
release and the revised data are noted below.
‘I’ahle 1 provides an overview of the direction of
monetary policy during 1991 and 1992.
February 4-5, 1992, Meeting
The Committee’s first task of the year was to
set growth ranges for the monetary aggregates.
A growth range of 2.5 percent to 8.5 percent
for Ma had been tentatively set in July 1991.
For several years before 1991 the FOMC had
been gradually lowering the range toward a lev-
el consistent with price stability. Several mem-
bers expressed a preference for resuming this
trend as a signal of the Committee’s commit-
ment to price level stability, though all found
the current range acceptable. Because of puz-
zling recent behavior of Ma (discussed above),
uncertainty was expressed over- how monetary
growth in these target ranges would affect eco-
nomic activity and inflation. The members
judged, however, that the 2.5 percent to 6.5
percent range would “provide adequate leeway
and operational flexibility to accommodate a
satisfactory economic performance.” They not-
ed, however, that “the substantial uncertainties
“April 3, 1992 press release, p. 12.42
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surrounding the outlook for Ma suggested that
the Committee would have to approach mone-
tary developments with a great deal of flexibili-
ty over the year ahead.” Growth ranges of 2.5
percent to 6.5 percent for M2 and 1 percent to
5 percent for MS were approved unanimously.
In setting policy for the weeks until the next
meeting, there was clear consensus that no dra-
matic action should be taken, particularly since
significant easing had been undertaken late in
1991. Nonetheless, the Committee expressed
concern about the uncertain state of the econo-
my. Though there were some positive signals,
nonfarm payroll employment had been flat in
December, and both retail sales and industrial
production had fallen slightly in November and
December.” The pace of inflation had continued
to decline. The economic projection prepared by
the Board staff predicted “a recovery of eco-
nomic activity.”~
Some members expressed concern about the
recent erratic behavior of M2. A staff analysis
indicated that M2 could be expected to grow
more rapidly given current conditions.
However, expansion of Ma probably would
continue to be restrained by the aggressive
reductions by depository institutions in their
offering rates on deposit components of this ag-
gregate and the continuation of related shifts of
M2 funds into higher-yielding capital market in-
struments. In addition, the expected pickup in
the pace of RTC resolutions over the balance of
the first quarter would tend to moderate the
growth of Ma and especially M3. To the extent
that subdued growth of the broader aggregates
were to reflect such special influences, there
would not be significant adverse implications
for the overall performance of the economy.”
The Committee voted to maintain existing con-
ditions in reserve markets but, with the possibil-
ity of deteriorating economic conditions in
mind, voted for a bias toward easing.
March 31, 1992, Meeting
New economic data did not clarify the eco-
nomic situation following the February 4—5
meeting. Nonfarm payroll employment dropped
slightly in January but reversed itself in Febru-
ary. Industrial production followed a similar but
more pronounced pattern. Strong retail sales
and shipments of nondefense capital goods
provided some bright spots in the January and
February data. Prices were increasing at about
the same rate as a year earlier. The economic
projection prepared by the Board staff predicted
“continued recovery in economic activity.”26
Reports on economic conditions in the 12 dis-
tricts tended to support this point of view.
While short-term rates had held steady since
the last meeting, longer-term rates jumped sub-
stantially, particularly at intermediate maturities
(figure 2). In the apparent absence of an intend-
ed or unintended action raising short-term rates,
the Committee viewed the jump as a sign that
markets were interpreting other economic news
as evidence of growing economic momentum.’7
The Committee was troubled by the renewal
of weak Ma growth. After significant easing late
in 1991, M2 growth was relatively robust in
January and February, but it appeared that M2
had quit growing or possibly declined in March
(data for the end of March were not yet availa-
ble), contrary to expectations at the previous
meeting. Some members were concerned that
slow growth of Ma, should it continue, “could
signal that monetary policy was not positioned
to support a satisfactory expansion.”” Some ob-
served that it was the behavior of M2 and M3
rather than economic conditions that persuaded
them in favor of bias toward ease in the direc-
tive.’”
The Committee unanimously adopted another
directive biased toward ease, though a minority
of members would have favored a symmetric
directive in view of evidence of a strengthening
economy. The majority, however, “remained
concerned about the vulnerability of the expan-
sion to a variety of risks.”°
April Easing
In early April it became clear that M2 had in
fact begun to decline during March. Together
with “indications that the economic expansion
was not as strong as its pace early in the year”
this led to a decision to ease monetary condi-
“April 3, 1992 press release, p. 13.
~ revisions indicate a slight increase in retail sales.
‘4April 3, 1992 press release, p. 6.
‘5April 3, 1992 press release, p. 18.
‘7May 22, 1992 press release, p. 4.
‘“May 22, 1992 press release, p. 12.
‘“May 22, 1992 press release, p. ia
‘“May 22, 1992 press release, p. 11.
‘“May 22, 1992 press release, p. 5.44
tions in early April.” Besides Ma, retail sales
was the only prominent economic indicator that
turned down. Employment and industrial pro-
duction both t-ose during March. After this eas-
ing action the federal funds rate fell more than
0.5 percentage points from around 4.0 percent,
but it eventually stabilized around 3.75 percent.
May 19, 1992, Meeting
Payroll employment and industrial production
increased through April, continuing the trend
started at the beginning of the year. Retail sales
rebounded from a March drop, and there was
evidence that fixed investment was picking up
after an April drop in shipments.” The staff pro-
jection was again “continuing recovery.” Over-
all, the evidence suggested a modest recovery
with a broad base across regions and industries.
Once again the behavior of the monetary ag-
gregates was a central focus of concern. Both
M2 and M3 contracted during March and from
March to April, leaving them below the levels
expected by the Committee at its March 31
meeting.’~Though many thought that tem-
porary technical considerations accounted for
part of this decline, some Committee members
regarded the weakness of M2 and M3 as “in-
dicative of an increase in the downside risks to
the expansion.” Others felt instead that “a vari-
ety of developments ... seemed to have altered
previous relationships between M2 and M3 and
measures of spending and income.”” Therefore
“satisfactory economic expansion would tend to
be consistent with weaker growth and a higher
velocity of M2 than would be suggested by
historical relationships.”~Some members felt in
addition that “the strength of Ml and reserves
- -- could raise questions about the consistency of
current monetary policy with progress toward
price stability.””
Though some members would have preferred
bias toward ease, whereas others preferred to
tilt the directive toward restraint, the Committee
agreed unanimously on a policy of unchanged
pressure in reserve markets with symmetric
language-
June 30—July 1, 1992, Meeting
Through May, payroll employment and indus-
trial production continued the weak upward
trend started at the beginning of the year, sug-
gesting that expansion continued at a very
modest pace. However, “recent information sug-
gested some weakening in the expansion.””
Growth of consumption expenditures in particu-
lar had slowed significantly. The staff projection
predicted a “modest pickup in economic growth
over the second half of the year.”4°Members
reported that the expansion continued to be ge-
ographically broadly based, though there were
significant exceptions, notably California.
The growth of M2 and M3 was still weak in
May, and available information for June indicat-
ed contraction, leaving the aggregates below the
lower end of the growth ranges.
The policy record indicates that at the June
30—July 1 meeting, FOMC members had more
diverse opinions about policy for the immediate
future than at the May meeting. Some members
preferred an immediate easing of policy. Of
those who preferred easing, some emphasized
“the recent indications of some slowing in the
expansion and the already considerable slack in
the economy,” whereas others highlighted “the
desirability of taking relatively prompt action to
foster growth in the broad measures of money
within the Committee’s ranges for the year.”4’
The Committee voted to return to a directive bi-
ased toward ease. John LaWare and ‘I’homas
Melzer objected to the asymmetric directive be-
cause “the current stance of monetary policy
was not impeding an expansion consistent with
the economy’s long-run potential”~’and because
in the context of the previous symmetric direc-
tive it “suggested an excessive emphasis on
short-term economic developments that might
undermine the credibility of the System’s long-
run policies.”4’
The Committee also reaffirmed the 1992
growth ranges for M2, M3 and total domestic
nonfinancial debt and tentatively decided to
maintain the same growth ranges for 1993.
“July 2, 1992 press release, p. 4.
“Revised retail sales data show a slight decline in April.
“July 2, 1992 press release, p. 6.
‘4July 2, 1992 press release, p. 6.
“July 2, 1992 press release, p. 11.
‘“July 2, 1992 press release, p. 11.
‘7July 2, 1992 press release, p. 12.
‘“July 2, 1992 press release, p. 12.
‘“August 21, 1992 press release, p. 7.
40August 21, 1992 press release, p. 5.
4’August 21, 1992 press release, p. 17.
4’August 21, 1992 press release, p.21.
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July Easing
The day after the FOMC meeting (July 2) the
Department of Labor reported that payroll em-
ployment had fallen by 117,000 (1.3 percent at
an annual rate) in June after four months of
slow growth.~~ Also on July 2 the Board of
Governors voted to lower the discount rate
from 3.5 percent to 3.0 percent, and open mar-
ket operations were implemented to let the fed-
eral funds rate fall by a comparable amount.4’
Figure 2 shows that the federal funds rate,
which had hovered around 3.75 percent, fell
sharply to about 3.25 percent. There was no tel-
ephone conference regarding this change in the
intermeeting policy.
August 18, 1992, Meeting
At its August 18 meeting, the Committee con-
cluded that though expansion continued, its
pace had slowed.~° July payroll employment had
reversed the June decline, but both numbers
were propped up by temporary hiring in a new
federally sponsored summer jobs program. In-
dustrial production followed the same pattern—
recovery in July from a June drop. Retail sales
increased moderately in July following a second-
quarter slowing, while shipments of nondefense
capital goods rose sharply in June. Market in-
terest rates at all maturities fell substantially
during July following the easing action but
probably also reflected the sluggishness of the
expansion. The staff projection pointed to a con-
tinuing pattern of “subdued economic expan-
sion.’47 Some members noted that “they could
not identify any sector of the economy that
seemed primed to provide the impetus needed
for a vigorous expansion,” though they noted
“considerable progress - -- toward redressing
earlier over-expansion and credit excesses.”4”
Members expressed considerable optimism
about the inflation outlook, citing “increasingly
persuasive evidence of slower rates of increase
in wages and prices.”4”
The monetary aggregates remained an impor-
tant concern. M2 and M3 contracted further in
July and continued below the lower end of the
growth ranges. Following the easing in early
July, Ml (which had fallen during June) began a
period of rapid growth in July.
Some members felt further easing was in ord-
er, but a majority favored an unchanged policy
that recognized the potential for conditions war-
ranting easing. ‘rhe behavior of the broad mone-
tary aggregates was regarded as a significant
factor “in favor of careful consideration of” fur-
ther easing.’°
A directive biased toward ease was adopted
with support from some members who favored
a symmetric directive. John LaWare and Thomas
Melzer voted against this action citing reasons
similar to those mentioned in their previous
dissent.
September Easing
In early September, after slower-than-expected
response of M2 to the July easing and economic
data (including a sharp increase in initial unem-
ployment insurance claims) that continued to in-
dicate sluggish economic growth, an easing
action was implemented. For technical reasons
the federal funds rate remained higher than ex-
pected following this action, but it settled to
around 3.0 percent by the end of October.”
October 6, 1992, Meeting
The policy record for the October meeting
gives a picture of economic developments very
similar to that from the previous meeting—
“economic activity was expanding at a subdued
pace.” Nonfarm payroll employment fell slight-
ly in August and again in September, though
the latter partly reflected the end of the sum-
mer jobs program mentioned above.” Industrial
production fell in August and partial informa-
tion for September “suggested further weak-
ness.” Consumption seemed to have slowed
through August after a period of robust growth.
Shipments of nondefense capital goods slowed
during July and August, a sign of possible
renewed weakness in investment. The staff
projection “indicated that economic activity
would expand at a slow pace in the current
44See U.S. Department of Labor (1992). Revised data show a
less substantial fall of 0.18 percent.
45October 9, 1992 press
46October 9, 1992 press
47October 9, 1992 press
48October 9, 1992 press






‘“October 9, 1992 press release, p. 12.
“November 20, 1992 press release, p. 4.
“November 20, 1992 press release, p. 1.
“Subsequent revision to the employment data made the
September drop into a slight rise as shown in Figure 6.
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quarter” but would pick up gradually in 1993.’~
Many members again worried that, “No impor-
tant sector of the economy seemed poised to
provide much impetus to business activity ...“
Several members felt that recent volatility in
some asset markets, particularly the foreign ex-
change market, underscored the risks of poten-
tially adverse developments.’” On the plus side
they noted that declines in the dollar and
domestic interest rates “suggested improved
conditions for greater expansion.”~The infla-
tion outlook continued to be favorable.
M2 and M3 began to grow again in August,
but only slowly. The weak growth appeared to
have continued into September, and both ag-
gregates were expected to finish September be-
low the bottom end of the growth range.
The same range of opinions on policy for the
immediate future was expressed. The policy
record, however, indicates a clear shift toward
ease in the balance of members’ opinions. Though
the policy directive contains exactly the same
wording stating a bias toward ease, the record
indicates that a majority of the Committee sup-
ported a directive “strongly” biased toward pos-
sible ease, with “a decided presumption of some
easing,” and with “a marked bias toward possi-
ble easing.”” Four members voted against the
directive. John LaWare and Thomas Melzer fa-
vored a symmetric directive for the reasons
stated at previous meetings, adding their con-
cern that an easing action might destabilize the
dollar.’” Mr. Melzer was also concerned that
continued rapid Ml growth might jeopardize
progress toward price stability. Two other Com-
mittee members, Jerry Jordan and Governor
Lawrence Lindsey, favored immediate easing
sufficient to “achieve the Committee’s pre-
announced target growth for M2.””0 They indi-
cated that this action should be accompanied by
an announcement that the growth range would
be lowered in 1993 to signal that the easing did
not indicate a discounting of the FOMC’s goal of
price stability.
November 17, 1992, Meeting
More optimism about the pace of economic
activity was evident at this meeting: “economic
activity had been expanding at a moderate
pace.””’ Nonfarm payroll employment had risen
slightly in October following two months of
declines, Industrial production rose in October
“following a modest increase in the third quart-
er.”°2(The July increase had offset slight declines
in August and September.) Stronger retail sales
in September and October, stronger housing
sales and starts, and anecdotal evidence all sug-
gested stronger overall consumption spending.
Another strong increase in outlays for producers’
durable equipment in the third quarter implied
renewed strength in investment. Increasing in-
terest rates, particularly at intermediate maturi-
ties, suggested that the more optimistic outlook
was shared by financial markets. The staff
projection “suggested a continuing expansion in
economic activity.””’ In discussion “the members
indicated that they were encouraged by the
somewhat more positive tone in the latest eco-
nomic reports and by the signs of improving
business and consumer confidence.””~
Ma growth picked up in October. Combined
with the more favorable economic reports, this
had deterred a move toward ease despite the
strong presumption in favor of ease at the Oc-
tober meeting. Further easing had been expected
by financial markets, and correction of this ex-
pectation was regarded as partly responsible for
the rise in interest rates.
Many members preferred a symmetric policy
for the upcoming weeks, believing that “risks to
the expansion were now fairly evenly balanced.””’
Others still preferred a bias toward ease, but
without the strong presumption understood at
the previous meeting. The Committee once
again adopted a directive biased toward ease.
Jordan, LaWare and Melzer voted against this
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December 22, 1992, Meeting
As figure 1 indicates, real GDP rose signifi-
cantly in the third quarter and the available evi-
dence for the fourth quarter indicated that this
pattern was continuing. Nonfarm payroll em-
ployment again rose slightly in November. In-
dustrial production also increased. Retail sales
rose sharply through November, and sales and
starts of single-family homes showed sizable
growth.”” Shipments of nondefense capital goods
continued to expand. Yields on long-term bonds
fell, but this was attributed to favorable market
reaction to “indications that the incoming Ad-
ministration would give emphasis to reducing
the federal budget deficit over time,” rather
than to the weakening recovery.“~The staff
projection “suggested a continuing expansion in
economic activity” but also indicated that the
momentum of the expansion would be partly
- offset by weaker export demand.”” Reports
from most regions reinforced a picture of “in-
creasingly robust business conditions,” though
there were notable exceptions, again including
California.
M2 slowed once again in November, and this
weakness appeared to continue into December.
A staff analysis pointed to sluggish growth of
M2 and M3 and substantial slowing in the
growth of Ml during the coming months.
The Committee felt that recent positive de-
velopments warranted “a shift toward a more
balanced approach to possible intermeeting
changes in policy.””” Though noting considerable
uncertainty about the future course of the
economy, “members observed that the next poli-
cy move might be in either direction.”” Despite
the slower Ma growth, a symmetric directive
was unanimously adopted.7’
SUMMARY
For much of 1992, stronger economic perfor-
mance seemed just around the corner. Three
times during the year, in April, July, and Sep-
tember, combinations of faltering M2 growth
and possibly slowing economic activity prompt-
ed easing actions. The July action accompanied
a half-point discount rate reduction. The econo-
my was growing fairly quickly by the end of
the year, despite forecasters’ midyear pes-
simism.
Although the FOMC devoted a good deal of at-
tention to anomalous behavior of Ma, the ag-
gregate ended the year slightly below the lower
end of its growth range. Various factors led to
doubt about the reliability of Ma as an indicator
of economic activity and inflation, but the impli-
cations of slow Ma growth combined with rapid
growth of reserves and Ml during 1992 are not
yet known.
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June 30—July 1, 1992
Messrs. Laware and Melzer dissented because
they judged an asymmetric directive, with a
bias toward easing, as being inappropriate at
this time. In their view, the current stance of
monetary policy was not impeding an expansion
consistent with the economy’s long-run poten-
tial. In addition, a bias toward ease, especially in
the context of the Committee’s decision at the
May meeting to adopt a symmetrical directive,
suggested an excessive emphasis on short-term
economic developments that might undermine
the credibility of the System’s long-run policies.
They were concerned that such a loss of credi-
bility could have adverse effects on the dollar in
foreign exchange markets and on long-term in-
terest rates in domestic markets. Mr. Melzer
also believed that, if additional easing were un-
dertaken, a greater policy reversal ultimately
would be necessary, making the attainment of
sustainable economic growth more difficult in
the long run.
August 18, 1992
Messrs. LaWare and Meizer dissented because
they did not favor a directive that was biased
toward possible easing during the intermeeting
period. In their view, monetary policy already
was appropriately stimulative, as evidenced in
part by the low level of short-term interest
rates and by the rapid growth in reserves since
early this year, and was consistent with the pro-
motion of economic growth in line with the
economy’s long-run potential. Business and con-
sumer confidence were in fact at low levels, hut
they reflected a variety of problems facing the
economy that were unrelated to the stance of
monetary policy. Accordingly, what was needed
at this point was a more patient monetary
policy—one that was less predisposed to react to
near-term weakness in economic data and that
allowed more time for the effects of earlier eas-
ing actions to be reflected in the economy. In-
deed, an easing move in present circumstances
might well stimulate inflationary concerns by
reducing confidence in the System’s willingness
to pursue an anti-inflationary policy and thus
could have adverse repercussions on domestic
bond markets and further damaging effects on
the dollar in foreign exchange markets.
October 6, 1992
Messrs. Jordan and Lindsey preferred immedi-
ate action by the Committee to increase the
availability of bank reserves sufficiently to
achieve the Committee’s pre-announced target
growth for Ma in 1992. Such reserve provision
would likely be associated with further declines
in short-term market interest rates. They be-
lieved that this policy action by the Committee
should be accompanied by an announcement of
reductions of the upper and lower limits of the
range for M2 growth in 1993. They felt that it
was important to make clear that near-term ac-
tion to increase M2 expansion was not an aban-
donment of the long-term objective of
non-inflationary monetary growth.
Messrs. LaWare and Meizer dissented because
they did not want to bias the directive toward
possible easing during the intermeeting period.
In their view, a variety of indicators, including
the level of short-term interest rates and the
growth of reserves, suggested that monetary
policy already was positioned to foster an ex-
pansion in economic activity consistent with the
economy’s long-run potential. Moreover, further
easing at this time woitid incur a substantial
risk of destabilizing the dollar in the foreign ex-
change markets. In these circumstances, they
favored a steady monetary policy that was not
disposed to react to near-term weakness in eco-
nomic data and that allowed more time for the
effects of earlier easing actions to be felt in the
economy. Mr. Meizer also expressed concern
that the progress already made toward achiev-
ing price stability might be jeopardized if very
rapid growth in Ml were to continue.
November 17, 1992
Mr. Jordan dissented because he preferred
taking immediate action to increase the availabil-
ity of bank reserves sufficiently to raise M249
growth to a pace more consistent with the Com-
mittee’s annual range. Because desirable M2 ex-
pansion in line with the Committee’s objectives
would be likely to fall within a lower range
next year, he would announce concurrently a
reduction in the 1993 range to make clear that
near-term action to increase M2 expansion was
not an abandonment of the long-term objective
of non-inflationary monetary growth.
Messrs. Laware and Melzer dissented because
they did not want to bias the directive toward
possible easing during the intermeeting period.
In their view, recent developments pointed to a
strengthening economy, and they favored a
steady policy that was not predisposed to react
to near-term weakness in economic or monetary
data. More time was needed to evaluate the ef-
fects of prior monetary policy actions, and they
were concerned that the adoption of a more
stimulative policy over the near term might well
establish a basis for greater inflation later. Mr.
Melzer was concerned that rapid growth in to-
tal hank reserves, the monetary base, and Ml
over the last two years might already have laid
a foundation for accelerating nominal GDP
growth and a reversal of the disinflationary
trend. In addition, he noted that policy errors
can easily be made at this stage of the business
cycle. In an economic expansion, efforts to
resist increases in the federal funds rate
through large reserve injections eventually lead
to higher inflation and higher nominal interest
rates.
December 22, 1992
No dissents.
,, ~v, .1